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The ESG Behaviors of Multinational Enterprises: An Exploration of Emerging and Developed 
Market Norms  
by 
Julie A. Salsbery  
April 2021 
Chair: Vikas Agarwal 
Major Academic Unit: Finance 
This paper examines how, when, and where environmental, social, and governance (ESG) 
behavior varies globally. I build on existing research that proposes country-of-origin constructs, 
such as regulatory and cultural foundations, influence ESG behavior of firms. Specifically, I 
propose that perceived differences in ESG standards for developed and emerging markets 
incentivize multinational enterprises (MNEs) to exhibit different levels of Corporate Social 
Irresponsibility (CSI) when operating abroad versus at home. My findings show that developed 
market-headquartered MNEs behave more irresponsibly in emerging markets than they do at 
home, while emerging market MNEs behave better when operating in developed markets. 
Importantly, the abroad-versus-home differences in the ESG behavior of MNEs appears to be 
driven more by governance than social or environmental factors. These findings contribute to the 
understanding of how presence in multiple markets shapes the ESG behavior of MNEs. This 
research contributes to practice by illuminating market-based norms that can act as benchmarks 
for ESG-focused investors and help guide shareholder engagement activities.  Importantly, it offers 
nuanced insights for global policymakers as they seek to achieve better ESG outcomes for society. 






“The business of business is business.” Milton Friedman, 1970 
Global headlines are rife with examples of firms behaving badly. From widespread 
corruption in Brazil and industrial chemical leaks in India to the use of child labor in China, the 
pursuit of profits can lead to the exploitation of people and harm to society and its environment. 
However, these incidents are not exclusively a problem in emerging market (EM) countries as 
the previous examples might suggest. Gender inequality and data breaches are a growing source 
of concern in the developed markets (DM), and corruption and fraud are enduring global 
problems. Fortunately, because media reports of irresponsible corporate actions have the 
potential to impact financial asset prices, investors are increasingly interested in examining how 
the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices and Environmental, Social, and 
Governance (ESG) behaviors of the firms they invest in may impact outcomes for society. 
Public interest, both anecdotally and through rising investment inflows, is further incentivizing 
investors to examine ESG behaviors.  According to the biennial Global Sustainable Investment 
Alliance1 report, asset flows into investment strategies that consider ESG factors grew to $30.7 
trillion in 2018, a 34% increase from 2016.  
While ESG-related investing is clearly one of the most important and fastest growing 
trends in asset management, ESG-related regulations and metrics by which firms are judged 
remain ill-defined and lacking in global consistency. To fill the current void, there are a number 
of third-party rating agencies that provide ESG ratings similar to the credit ratings provided by 
firms such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. Unfortunately, these ratings are often based 
 
1 http://www.gsi-alliance.org/trends-report-2018/. To put this figure in a context, mutual fund assets globally at the 





upon a firm’s CSR report, statements on its website, or how management answers ESG-related 
questions when engaged on such topics. As a result, these ratings may suffer from self-reporting 
bias, or may more accurately reflect what a firm claims to do rather than its actual behavior. 
This research utilizes a unique database from RepRisk that provides firm-level raw scores based 
on actual ESG-related violations as reported in the media or by non-government organizations 
(NGOs). In this way, it measures the Corporate Social Irresponsibility (CSI) of firms (Fiaschi 
et al., 2017; Strike et al., 2006). This research aggregates these firm-level scores to analyze 
patterns of CSI across developed and emerging markets. 
Aligning with investors’ most pressing concern, literature from the field of finance is 
predominantly focused on how ESG factors affect the financial performance of firms. While 
there is evidence on both sides, the majority of research demonstrates a positive relation 
between ESG quality and financial performance (e.g., see meta-analysis by Friede et al., 2015). 
From the practitioners’ point of view, the knowledge that ESG factors may influence financial 
performance heightens the need to understand how to judge a firm’s ESG quality relative to its 
peers, as well as how ESG trends are evolving in global markets. A smaller but growing and 
multidisciplinary body of research (spanning international business, ethics, strategic 
management, and finance) examines factors that may influence the ESG quality of firms 
globally. A portion of this body of research looks at how and why multinational enterprise 
(MNE) ESG quality changes when operating abroad. Because MNEs are responsible for an 
estimated one-third of global output, half of global exports, and one-fourth of global 
employment, they are in a powerful position to significantly impact global ESG outcomes.2 This 
 






paper expands upon the subject by examining the CSI of MNEs from both emerging and 
developed markets when operating at home and abroad. Specifically, I ask, “Do multinational 
enterprises export or adopt Corporate Social Irresponsibility?” 
I begin my analysis by proposing a model of behavior that explains the relation between 
a MNE’s CSI behavior at home versus abroad, based on the location of its headquarters. The 
model proposes that MNEs will either choose to ‘export’ the CSI norms of their home market 
(headquarters) or ‘adopt’ the CSI norms of their host market (location of foreign operations). 
For example, because DM-headquartered firms often expand into EM to achieve a competitive 
advantage through lower supply chain costs, one might expect DM-headquartered MNEs to 
behave worse when operating in emerging markets than they do at home in the developed 
markets. Such a difference in CSI behavior would signal an ‘adoption’ of the weaker ESG 
regulatory environment (poorer working conditions, lower environmental thresholds, etc.) in 
EM. Next, I analyze the degree to which CSI subcomponent behaviors (environmental, social, 
and governance-specific actions) contribute to the difference in MNE behavior at home and 
abroad. Lastly, I examine how CSI has changed over time for EM- and DM- headquartered 
firms when operating at home and abroad. 
Importantly, this research contributes to practice in two ways. First, by identifying the 
CSI norms in emerging and developed markets and for MNEs when operating both at home and 
abroad, I provide a valuable and relative context for investors when analyzing a particular firm’s 
ESG quality. Second, distinguishing the patterns of CSI subcomponent behavior 
(environmental, social, and governance) between EM- and DM-headquartered firms will 





changing over time will enable policymakers and activists to better focus their agendas to 






II LITERATURE REVIEW & CONTRIBUTIONS 
A rapidly growing proportion of investors believe ESG factors will contribute to future 
asset returns. In concert with this practitioner-based trend, there is an extensive and rich body 
of academic literature examining the relation between ESG factors and financial performance. 
Though inconclusive and difficult to generalize, a majority of the research shows a positive 
relation between ESG quality and performance (Friede et al., 2015). Outside of the financial 
performance link to ESG, there is a smaller, more recent body of multidisciplinary research that 
examines the factors that influence a firm’s ESG quality. This research aims to contribute to 
three key components within this body of knowledge. 
II.1 Measurement of ESG Quality 
The first contribution relates to the variable being used to examine the ESG-quality 
construct, which is often referred to as Corporate Social Performance (CSP) (Cai et al., 2016; 
Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Zyglidopoulos et al., 2016). The vast majority of research uses 
either a firm’s CSR report or third-party ESG ratings to quantify a firm’s CSP. There are four 
notable drawbacks in using these sources as a proxy for the CSP construct. First, CSR reports 
typically contain philanthropic initiatives and a description of the firm’s commitments to social 
and environmental issues, rather than a robust or quantitative assessment of a firm’s ESG-
related actions. While third-party ESG ratings utilize some popularly agreed upon and 
consistent ESG metrics, they also may rely heavily on statements of ESG-related intentions 
made in a firm’s CSR report or on its website, as well as through direct conversation with firm 
management. As such, these sources may be subject to self-reporting bias and as a result may 
reflect a firm’s claim or desired level of ESG quality more so than its actual ESG-related 





utilize both positive and negative ESG information. Because negative ESG-related actions have 
shown to have more impact on financial performance (Capelle-Blancard & Petit, 2019; Krüger, 
2015) and negative ESG developments are more important in terms of risk for investors 
(Dorfleitner et al., 2015), adding positive and negative ESG factors together may create an 
offsetting effect that obscures the value of the negative event or factor (Strike et al., 2006). 
A third drawback for ESG ratings is that the lack of globally-accepted, industry-specific 
reporting metrics or guidelines causes third-party ESG ratings to be inconsistent. For example, 
an examination of three popular ESG rating providers (Asset4/ThomsonReuters, KLD/MSCI, 
and Bloomberg) found a lack of convergence in how ESG concepts are measured as well as the 
distribution of the ratings (Dorfleitner et al., 2015). While practitioners appropriately utilize 
third-party ESG ratings as an independent view or opinion of the ESG quality of a firm rather 
than a factual assessment of its quality, the use of third-party ratings in academic research may 
introduce uncertainty about construct validity. The fourth drawback is timeliness. Because ESG 
ratings often rely on underlying data that may be static or persistent and the ratings themselves 
are often updated annually, they may be more reflective of past conditions and/or be inefficient 
at capturing timely changes in behavior (Chatterji et al., 2016; Dimson et al., 2015; Dorfleitner 
et al., 2015). 
Lastly, the majority of research focuses exclusively on the environmental and social 
aspects of the ESG construct, and purposely excludes the governance aspect (Amor-Esteban et 
al., 2018; Dyck et al., 2019; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Marano et al., 2017), while others focus 
solely on social (Fiaschi et al., 2017) or governance factors (Filatotchev et al., 2019). This paper 
expands on this body of research by (1) using actual ESG-related behaviors rather than a firm’s 





matter most to investors, and (3) examining a fuller range of ESG constructs (environmental, 
social, governance, and cross-cutting, also referred to herein as E, S, G, and CC; see IV.1. Data 
Sources for more details). 
II.2 Factors influencing ESG quality 
The second contribution relates to the factors that influence the level of ESG quality. 
The two most often researched sources of influence are a firm’s country-of-origin (COO, or 
where a firm is headquartered) and the firm’s strategic business motivation for embarking on 
ESG-related commitments or initiatives. Within COO-oriented research, independent variables 
are typically nation-level constructs such as the degree of freedoms (i.e., media and political), 
the legal framework (common law or civil law), and World Governance Indicators such as 
corruption, rule of law, political stability, etc., (Amor-Esteban et al., 2018; Fiaschi et al., 2017; 
Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Marano et al., 2017; Tashman et al., 2019); though more abstract 
concepts such as harmony, culture, and liberty have also been examined (Cai et al., 2016). From 
the research on strategic business motivations as the main driver of ESG quality, stakeholder 
pressure and institutional ownership are shown to contribute (Dimson et al., 2015; Dyck et al., 
2019; Filatotchev & Stahl, 2015; Surroca et al., 2013), though reputation-building efforts is also 
frequently theorized as a contributor (Filatotchev & Stahl, 2015; Gugler & Shi, 2009). This 
paper advances and combines these two sources of influence. First, rather than use nation-level 
constructs, which can be hard to measure and are often persistent, this paper utilizes mean CSI 
scores as representation of the ‘norm’ – the typical or standard level of CSI for the group/region 
being examined (EM and DM in this case). Understanding market norms is well-aligned with 
the industry standard of looking at developed versus emerging market credit quality and the 





and strategic business motivations are considered in both hypotheses development and the 
explanation of findings. 
II.3 Global Context 
The third contribution relates to the global context of the ESG behavior being studied. 
When examining MNEs, there are two dimensions that may be considered – where the firm is 
headquartered and where the CSI takes place. Most often, the extant literature is focused on 
ESG quality as it relates to either DM-headquartered (Amor-Esteban et al., 2018; Ioannou & 
Serafeim, 2012; Surroca et al., 2013) or EM-headquartered MNEs (Fiaschi et al., 2017; 
Filatotchev & Stahl, 2015; Marano et al., 2017; Tashman et al., 2019) in isolation. When 
location of CSI is considered, it is often solely from the perspective of when the MNE operates 
abroad. This paper presents a more holistic approach by examining both DM- and EM-
headquartered MNEs and comparing the CSI norms of MNEs to the CSI norms at home and 
abroad.   
In summary, while there is growing evidence that ESG factors can contribute to financial 
performance, and well-articulated reasons for why MNEs undertake and reveal their ESG 
commitments, there is little understanding of who is doing what and where. This paper expands 
on the existing body of knowledge first by using publicly reported CSI instead of a firm’s self-
reported claims to quantify ESG impact, second by aggregating CSI as an indication of a 
market’s norm rather than relying on nation-level constructs to gauge market-based differences, 
and third, provides a more holistic view by examining CSI patterns at home and abroad for 
MNEs headquartered in both developed and emerging markets. By filling these gaps, this 
research contributes to sustainable finance practice by focusing on the negative or irresponsible 





market lens investors use. A better understanding of the CSI norms in EM and DM, as well as 
the sources of difference in MNE norms when operating at home and abroad, will help investors 






III HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
III.1 Background 
In asset management, EM firms are typically considered to be riskier than DM firms and 
much of that assessment has to do with a perceived poorer quality of governance, often related 
to their COO. The COO-based perception of less regulation and fewer resources in EM appears 
to be translating into an opinion that EM countries also have less rigor around ESG issues. For 
example, it is generally accepted that there is a positive relationship between credit quality and 
ESG quality for sovereign bonds (i.e., Allianz, MSCI3) and this relationship appears to be 
mimicked in ESG ratings which are not equally distributed across EM and DM. Specifically, a 
report by MSCI states that “More than 80% of the constituents of the MSCI World Index [DM] 
received an ESG Rating between BB and AA. Conversely, more than 80% of the constituents 
of the MSCI Emerging Markets Index and the MSCI AC Asia ex Japan Index were rated at or 
below BBB.4” This DM-EM assessment may be appropriate for domestic-only firms, but 
because MNEs cross national boundaries, it raises the question as to the appropriateness of a 
generalization to all firms. In other words, if ESG behavior in EM is poorer than in DM, further 
investigation is needed to determine if domestic or foreign firms are responsible for the 
difference. Leveraging institutional theory, specifically regarding the homogeneity of business 
practices that develops within organizational groups over time (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), this 










dimensions: (1) the market where the CSI takes place, and (2) the market of headquarters for 
the firm that perpetrates the CSI. 
III.2 Proposed Behavior Types 
This research begins with the premise that a market-based aggregation of firm-level CSI 
scores can be regarded as the regulatory or societal ‘norm’ of the CSI of that market. For 
example, the average of all DM-headquartered firm-level CSI scores from operations in DM 
countries at a specific time can be used as a proxy for the ‘DM CSI norm’ at that time. The 
same can be said for the aggregation of EM-headquartered firm-level CSI scores in EM 
countries for the same time period. Given this, one can compare the CSI norms of MNEs when 
operating abroad relative to the ‘home’ (headquartered) market norm and the ‘host’ (foreign 
location of operations) market norm. A diagram of these norms and the behavioral relationships 
is shown in Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1: Model of CSI Norms 
This paper proposes two CSI behavior types for MNEs when operating abroad: Exporter 
and Adopter. A CSI Exporter would score similarly abroad as it does at home, while the Adopter 
would have an abroad score that is more similar to the host’s norm. For example, let us assume 
that the DM CSI home norm is 40 and the EM CSI home norm is 80. If the average of DM-





they would be considered ‘exporters’ of the relatively better DM CSI home norm (note that a 
lower value of CSI is better because it corresponds to lesser or fewer ESG-related violations). 
Alternatively, if the average of DM-headquartered MNE scores is closer to the EM CSI home 
norm when operating abroad, they would be considered ‘adopters’ of the poorer EM host norm 
(note that the EM CSI home norm is the EM ‘host’ norm when compared to a DM MNE 
operating in EM). A diagram of the two behavior types is shown below for both DM- and EM-
headquartered MNEs.5 
 
5 See Section IV.2 Unit of Analysis for a description of DM and EM. There are 57 
sovereign territories that are not classified as EM or DM and are excluded from this research: 
Åland Islands, American Samoa, Andorra, Anguilla, Antarctica, Bermuda, Bonaire, Sint 
Eustatius and Saba, Bouvet Island, British Indian Ocean Territory, Cayman Islands, Christmas 
Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Cook Islands, Cuba, Curaçao, Falkland Islands, Faroe Islands, 
French Guiana, French Polynesia, French Southern Territories, Gibraltar, Greenland, 
Guadeloupe, Guam, Guernsey, Heard Island and McDonald Islands, Holy See, Isle of Man, 
Jersey, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Liechtenstein, Martinique, Mayotte, Monaco, 
Montserrat, New Caledonia, Niue, Norfolk Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Palestine, State 
of Pitcairn, Qatar, Republic of North Macedonia, Réunion, Saint Barthélemy, Saint Helena, 
Saint Martin (French part), Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Sint Maarten (Dutch part), South 
Georgia/South Sandwich Islands, Svalbard and Jan Mayen, Tokelau, Turks and Caicos Islands, 







Figure 2: Models of CSI Behavior Types 
In the above model, DM MNEs that choose to adhere to a higher standard of ESG-
related conduct when operating in EM, such as the global labor standards often expressed in 
international treaties, would be exhibiting ‘Exporter’ behavior. DM MNEs may choose the 
Exporter behavior type for a variety of reasons including reputation building, meeting global 
stakeholders’ demands, increasing local community relations, or due to fear of market or 
consumer backlash (Dimson et al., 2015; Gugler & Shi, 2009). Alternatively, DM-
headquartered firms that expand into emerging market locations to take advantage of more 
lenient environmental or social regulatory requirements (i.e., ‘pollution havens’) would be 
exhibiting ‘Adopter’ behavior when operating abroad in EM. For example, if a DM MNE 
perceives that the EM environmental laws are less comprehensive or strict, or that the penalties 
for breaking them are less severe in EM, a DM-headquartered MNE may exhibit a higher level 
of CO2 emissions when operating in EM (i.e., one that is closer to the EM norm) than it does 
when operating in a DM country. Importantly, higher CSI when operating abroad may also be 
due to less nefarious reasons such as weaker managerial quality or limited resources in foreign 





H1a When operating abroad, developed market MNEs either export the CSI norm of 
their DM headquarters or adopt the CSI norm of their EM host. 
EM MNEs may also be exporters or adopters of CSI when operating abroad. EM MNEs 
(1) must work extra hard to overcome the perceived negative risks associated with their EM 
COO in order to maintain their ‘right to do business’ in developed markets, and (2) understand 
that the risks of non-compliance (legal, financial, and reputational) could be catastrophic, there 
is a strong incentive for EM MNEs to maintain better ESG standards of behavior when operating 
abroad in developed markets. While the majority of literature expects EM MNEs will be 
‘adopters’ of the higher quality ESG standard of their developed market hosts for the reasons 
just noted (Fiaschi et al., 2017; Zyglidopoulos et al., 2016), there is very little discussion 
regarding the potential for EM-headquartered firms to export a poorer standard of ESG behavior 
when operating abroad in DM. Nonetheless, this outcome is possible and there is anecdotal 
evidence to support that is does happen. For example, there has been a notable increase in media 
reports related to the misuse of personal data, violation of patent regulations, and international 
trade agreements by EM MNEs when operating in DM. One of the largest scandals involves a 
Chinese telecommunications conglomerate that faces numerous indictments of governance 
related misconduct in US courts.6 
H1b When operating abroad, emerging market MNEs either export the CSI norm of 








Because DM MNEs may seek to exploit easier conditions in certain ESG regulations 
(i.e., lower workplace safety requirements), the DM CSI norm when operating abroad is 
expected to be significantly influenced by EM host norms. Likewise, because EM MNEs may 
rely on good or strong CSP as part of their ‘license to do business’ in DM, the EM CSI norm 
when operating abroad will likely be influenced by DM host norms. That said, there are reasons 
to expect CSI home norms will also have an influence on CSI norms abroad. One source of 
home influence is corporate culture. This source of influence is discussed in management 
literature as a strategic business decision where DM MNEs choose to mimic their traditional 
business strategies when operating abroad, thereby creating a ‘global strategy’ (Wright et al., 
2005).  Strike et al. (2006) note that US MNEs in particular may seek to develop a competitive 
advantage by building strong, socially responsible reputations according to US standards. Coke 
and McDonalds are frequently mentioned as examples of this approach to exporting DM ESG 
behavior norms when operating abroad. 
H2a Both DM CSI home norms and EM CSI host norms are expected to influence DM 
MNE CSI when operating abroad in EM.  
H2b  Both EM CSI home norms and DM CSI host norms are expected to influence EM 
MNE CSI when operating abroad in DM.  
III.3 Sources of Difference in CSI Norms 
Sources of difference in CSI behavior scores when operating at home and abroad are 
likely to come from a variety of underlying factors that relate to all four subcomponents 
(environmental, social, governance, cross-cutting as described in Section IV.1. Data Sources 





CO2 emissions, water quality, etc.) may be one of the ways a DM-headquartered firm can 
improve its profit margins by expanding into an emerging market. Similarly, differences in 
social norms (i.e., child labor laws, gender diversity expectations, worker safety, etc.) in some 
emerging markets may incentivize DM-headquartered companies to exploit these differences 
to attain a competitive advantage on labor costs. Anecdotally, one might expect governance 
behavior to contribute the least to the difference in CSI behavior for DM-headquartered firms. 
One could assume that because developed market MNEs have well-developed management 
teams that manage the firm’s global strategy and operations, developed market MNEs are likely 
to exhibit similar qualities of governance regardless of when operating at home or abroad 
(Wright et al., 2005). Nevertheless, the presence of local management teams (i.e., emerging 
market sourced) to handle day-to-day operations suggests governance will still contribute 
somewhat to the difference in the CSI norm at home and abroad. 
H3a The difference in DM CSI norms at home and abroad is due to some combination 
of environmental, social, governance, and cross-cutting behavior. 
Recognizing that ESG standards generally are likely to be different if not stricter in a 
developed market host country, all four subcomponents, E, S, G, and CC, are likely to contribute 
to the difference in CSI behavior for EM MNEs when operating at home in EM versus abroad 
in DM. However, contrary to the explanation above for DM MNEs (expecting less of the 
difference to be associated with issues of governance), EM MNEs are likely to have much better 
governance records when operating abroad in DM. In practice, one of the main sources of 
difference between the credit quality of EM and DM firms (due to COO) is governance, with 





H3b The difference in EM CSI norms at home and abroad is due to some combination 
of environmental, social, governance, and cross-cutting behavior. 
III.4 Changes in CSI behavior Over Time 
The increase in public interest and investor activism, surge in ESG-related capital flows, 
and nascent development of public policies to guide the ESG behaviors of firms, all suggest 
CSI scores have changed materially over the 14-year sample period. Specifically, the increased 
public and private scrutiny suggests firms may be more sensitive to the negative reputational 
and financial impacts from CSI than they were in the past. In this way, one can reasonably 
expect that firms should be exhibiting less CSI over time. 
H4 CSI norms have begun to improve in both emerging and developed markets. 
Regarding the subcomponent source of change in CSI norms, an increased awareness 
around climate change and the global desire to reduce CO2 emissions suggests environmental 
incidents may have improved the most. Similarly, a growing focus on equal pay, race and 
gender diversity, and other labor and workplace issues has likely resulted in fewer or less-severe 
social incidents and thus an improvement in social norms. Conversely, because there has existed 
a longer and consistent focus on good governance, even in non-ESG investing, there may not 
be as much improvement in governance-related irresponsibility over time. 
H5 Environmental and Social irresponsibility norms are expected to show 
improvement over time, while Governance norms are expected to show little 
variation. 
After determining whether CSI and subcomponent norms are improving over time in 





multinational) are responsible for the improvement or lack of improvement. Lacking evidence 
from literature and practice about how EM or DM headquartered firms may be altering their 
CSI behavior at home and abroad over time, I address this gap by analyzing the patterns of CSI 
and subcomponent norms over time rather than formulating specific hypotheses.  
P1 Examines CSI norms over time for EM and DM incident locations, separated by 
market of headquarters. 
P2 Examines the E, S, G and CC norms over time for EM and DM incident locations, 






IV DATA SOURCES & VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
IV.1 Data Sources 
Practitioners and academics alike have largely relied upon third-party ESG ratings from 
companies such as MSCI, Sustainalytics, and Thomson ASSET4. Ratings from these sources 
are often substantially based on company provided information from websites, 10-Ks, annual 
reports, proxy statements, and CSR reports. Further, prospective ratings are sometimes shared 
and “companies are invited to participate in a formal data verification process”. 7 These two 
practices – using company-sourced inputs and allowing company feedback before ratings are 
finalized – introduce the possibility for self-reporting bias. As such, one can consider these 
ratings more reflective of a firm’s claim about the quality of its ESG practices than the firm’s 
actual ESG-related behavior. Setting aside the possibility for malintent (commonly referred to 
as ‘greenwashing’), common sense tells us that a claim about one’s behavior may be very 
different from actual behavior. Further, the fact that some ratings methodologies have changed 
over time is a potential source of construct validity (Dorfleitner et al., 2015). 
Data for this research comes from RepRisk, an independent third-party ESG data 
provider headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland. RepRisk’s approach has been consistent since 
its inception and is different from ESG rating providers because it excludes self-reported 
information and data. Specifically, “Born out of credit risk management, the purpose of 
RepRisk’s dataset is not to provide ESG ratings, but to systematically identify and assess 
material ESG risks. We have always taken an outside-in approach to ESG risks, by analyzing 
 





information from public sources and stakeholders and intentionally excluding company self-
disclosures.”8  
The raw data provided by RepRisk is a time series of publicly reported, ESG-related 
incidents of regulatory violations or irresponsible behavior. Each incident is coded by (1) the 
firm or firms involved in the incident, (2) up to 28 ESG-related principles the incident violates, 
and (3) the country or countries the incident impacts. Artificial intelligence does the initial 
screening of the incident report, which is then verified and scored by human analysts. Analysts 
score each incident across three dimensions: severity, reach, and novelty. Severity can have a 
value of 1, 10, 100 with 100 being the worst, and is an indication of the negative impact or 
harshness of the event. Reach can take a value of 1-3, with 3 being the greatest reach, and is 
based on the publication’s circulation. Lastly, novelty takes a value of 1 if it is the first time the 
incident has been reported and 2 if it is a repeat reporting. Incidents are recorded once when the 
event takes place and only recorded subsequently if (1) it is escalated to a more influential 
source, (2) it appears again after six weeks, or (3) additional issues emerge. 
This raw data is converted into an incident score that ranges from 1-100. I provide a 
brief description here, but the score documentation is available from RepRisk9. Because a firm’s 
ESG riskiness is assumed to rise exponentially, incidents are transformed into a geometric mean 









Each new ESG incident assigned to a company is added to any prior ESG score, but the prior 
score is assumed to have decayed exponentially to zero over two years. These raw scores are 
then scaled to 1-100 using an exponential cumulative distribution function to account for the 
fact that (1) larger companies will have more violations and be more actively reported, (2) over 
time there seems to be a general increase in incident violations or reporting10. As such, higher 
scores indicate worse ESG-related behavior and lower scores indicate behavior that is less-bad. 
Given the nature of the data (ESG-related violations or irresponsible behavior), good ESG-
related behavior is not indicated. This scoring process is run at the overall ESG-level as well as 
four subcomponents, E, S, G, and CC. Table 1 provides RepRisk’s categorization of the 28 
ESG-related principles (to which incidents are coded when violated) within the E, S, G, and CC 
subcomponents. 
[Insert Table 1] 
a. Unit of Analysis 
 Based on the country where the incident took place, the firm-level incident scores 
described above are aggregated into developed and emerging market averages for each day in 
the sample (January 2, 2007 through July 31, 2020). 11 Market designation for each country 
follows the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) classification. For 
the purposes of this research, the IMF’s ‘Advanced Economies’ are coded as DM countries, 
while ‘Emerging Market and Developing Economies’ are coded as EM countries (see Table 2 
for the complete list of DM countries and Table 3 for EM countries). For example, all scores 
 
10 https://www.reprisk.com/ 
11 Countries are identified as Emerging or Developed based on the classification used in the IMF’s World Economic 





for firms with ESG-related violations in an emerging market country on May 30, 2008 are 
averaged into the emerging market CSI score on May 30, 2008. As such, the mean of the CSI 
EM variable represents the ‘norm’ (defined as usual, typical, or standard) level of CSI in 
emerging markets for the sample period. As a result, the unit of analysis is defined by date 
(subscript t, day) and market (subscript i, DM or EM). 
b. Variable Construction 
The primary set of variables are average CSI scores and subcomponent E, S, G, and CC 
scores attributed to each market (DM and EM). For example, CSI_EM is a time series of the 
average scores (with a value 0-100) for all ESG-related incidents that occur in an emerging 
market country, while E_EM is a time series of the average scores for only the Environmental 
incidents occurring in an emerging market country. In this manner, each variable is designed to 
represent the ‘norm’ level of CSI for a certain ESG-related incident type, in a specific market 
location (Emerging or Developed). 
 
Figure 3: 2x2 Matrix of Behavior Norms 
Variables that represent ‘CSI norms’ are calculated based on a 2x2 matrix using the 
same EM/DM market classification for the location of the ESG incident and firm headquarters. 
In Figure 3 at right, the four CSI norms in the center follow the naming convention whereby the 





incident. Given this convention, scores are calculated at the topline CSI level as well as for the 
four subcomponents for each of these four main variable types. The naming convention for the 
final variables is HQ_Location_Subcomponent. For example, DM_EM_G is the mean score for 
all incidents incurred by a DM-headquartered firm (i.e., Apple, Volkswagen), occurring in an 
emerging market (i.e., China, Mexico), that violate a governance principle (i.e., fraud, tax 
evasion). This is designed to represent the governance norm for DM firms when operating in 
EM. Importantly, MNEs are represented in both the abroad and home norms. A complete list 
of variables and their definitions is available in Table 4 in the Appendix. 
IV.2 Background/Summary Statistics 
 I begin my analysis by examining the CSI in EM and DM without regard for the market 
headquarters for the perpetrator of the CSI. The summary statistics shown in Table 5 
demonstrate that across all incident types, the mean CSI scores are lower in DM than in EM. 
The highest mean CSI score in developed markets is for cross-cutting violations, while the 
highest mean CSI score in emerging markets is for social violations.  
[Insert Table 5] 
 A paired-samples t-test was conducted to determine if the mean CSI and subcomponent 
scores for DM are significantly different from those for EM. The results shown in Table 6 
establish that CSI and subcomponent irresponsibility scores are significantly lower (i.e., better) 
in DM than in EM. This result supports the general expectation for these two markets, i.e., that 
similar to credit quality, EM CSI is worse than DM CSI, on average. 







Having established that there is a significant difference in CSI scores in EM and DM, 
the next section analyzes how domestic and foreign firm mean scores compare to the CSI norms 
in each market location. 
V.1 CSI Behavior Types – Adopter or Exporter 
First, I examine the mean CSI scores based on the 2x2 matrix. As shown in Figure 4 at 
right, and in the Summary Statistics in Table 7, DM-headquartered firms behave worse when 
operating abroad in EM versus their CSI norm at home and EM-headquartered firms appear to 
behave better when operating abroad in DM versus their CSI norm at home. While this 
directional difference in CSI scores at home and abroad is large and contextually supported by 
extant literature, the similarity in CSI norms when operating at home for both market 
headquarters (DM 46.53 and EM 46.64) is both remarkable and unanticipated. When examining 
the subcomponent norms, similar home-abroad patterns for DM and EM are found, as shown 
in the 2x2 matrix in Figure 5 below. For all subcomponents, DM-headquartered irresponsibility 
norms are much higher when operating abroad versus at home, while EM-headquartered 
irresponsibility norms are lower when operating abroad versus at home. 
 






Figure 5: 2x2 Matrix of Subcomponent Norm Scores 
 
[Insert Table 7] 
To test hypotheses 1a and 1b, paired-samples t-tests were conducted to analyze (a) the 
DM CSI norm when operating abroad to both the DM home and EM host norms, and (b) the 
EM CSI norm when operating abroad to both the EM home and DM host norms. 
DM_EM_CSIabroad vs. DM_DM_CSIhome, and vs. EM_EM_CSIhost  (1a) 
EM_DM_CSIabroad vs. EM_EM_CSIhome, and vs. DM_DM_CSIhost  (1b) 
The paired-samples t-tests in Table 8 show that when operating abroad DM-
headquartered scores are significantly higher than both their home and host norms, and EM-
headquartered scores are significantly lower. As suggested in the discussion of the summary 
statistics above, there is not a significant difference in the CSI norms for DM- and EM-
headquartered firms when operating at home.  
[Insert Table 8] 
Because there is not a significant difference between the CSI home norm scores, it is 
technically impossible for either DM- or EM-headquartered firms to behave as ‘adopters’ or 





model. Therefore, I must reject Hypothesis 1a and 1b that DM and EM firms adopt their host 
market CSI norms or export their home market CSI norms. However, given that DM-
headquartered firms behave worse when operating abroad in EM, and EM-headquartered firms 
behave better when operating abroad in DM, it is plausible that both are adopting the perceived 
CSI qualities of their host market (i.e., higher standards of ESG behavior in DM, and lower in 
EM). Figure 6 spatially depicts the results for the 2x2 matrix of CSI norms; the prefix indicates 
the market headquarters, while Home and Abroad indicate the location of the CSI. 
 
Figure 6: Schematic of CSI Behavior Types 
 
Though not part of the original hypotheses, the same analysis is performed for the 
subcomponent E, S, G and CC scores. The summary statistics are shown in Table 9 and results 
from the paired samples t-tests are in Table 10, both in the Appendix. The subcomponent 







Figure 7: Schematic of Subcomponent Behavior Types 
 
• Environmental: EM headquartered firms adopt, but do not exceed the better CSI norm 
of their DM host. DM headquartered firms adopt and exceed the poorer CSI norm of 
their EM host. 
• Social: EM headquartered firms adopt and exceed the better CSI norm of their DM host. 
DM headquartered firms adopt and exceed the poorer CSI norm of their EM host. 
• Governance & Cross-Cutting: DM home scores are significantly higher than EM 
home norms. Because of this change in relative positioning for home scores, EM 
headquartered firms export and exceed their better EM CSI home norm when operating 
in their DM host. DM headquartered firms export and exceed their poorer DM CSI home 
norm when operating in their EM host. 
 
Notably, as evident in Figure 7, the worst CSI norms across all subcomponent scores 
are attributed to DM-headquartered firms when operating abroad in EM. Conversely, for all but 
the Environmental subcomponent, EM-headquartered firms have the ‘least-egregious’ CSI 





Next, I test the hypotheses that both host and home CSI norms influence the CSI of 
MNEs when operating abroad. Using linear regression analysis, I regress the CSI score when 
operating abroad on two independent variables, CSI scores for the home and host markets. This 
analysis is performed for DM-headquartered firms operating in EM (2a) and EM-headquartered 


































  (2b) 
The results of the regression analysis and t-statistics of the coefficient are reported in 
Table 11. For both DM- and EM-headquartered firms operating abroad (Panels A and B, 
respectively), CSI home norms and CSI host norms contribute positively and significantly to 
the CSI norm when operating abroad and are jointly non-zero. For DM-headquartered norms, 
CSI home norms contribute 2.5 times as much to the variance in CSI when operating abroad 
than do host norms, whereas for EM-headquartered firms there is no significant difference 
between the contributions from home and host CSI norms. While the literature suggests home 
influence on DM-headquartered firms may result in better ESG-related behavior in subsidiaries 
abroad versus the host norms, as part of a strategic business decision, these results suggest a 
more nefarious though still strategic reason may be at work. A practical example of this result 
might occur if a DM-headquartered textile firm that relies on cheap labor for its competitive 
advantage and exhibits social irresponsibility at home (i.e., gender discrimination, poor working 
conditions) exploits the same social violations but to a greater degree when operating abroad in 
EM. 





Though not part of the original hypotheses, the same analysis is performed for the 
subcomponent Environmental, Social, Governance and Cross-Cutting scores to determine 
which market norms (home or host) influence the subcomponent norms for MNEs when 
operating abroad. The results of the regression analysis and t-statistics are reported in Table 12 
in the Appendix. For both markets and across all subcomponents, home and host norms exhibit 
statistically significant, different, and jointly non-zero effects on CSI norms when operating 
abroad. Notably for DM MNEs, the size of the coefficient for home irresponsibility for social, 
governance, and cross-cutting is double or more than the size of the coefficients for the host 
norms. This suggests that DM MNEs behavior abroad for these subcomponent behaviors is 
much more influenced by their patterns of behavior at home. The opposite holds for EM MNEs 
when it comes to their environmental and social irresponsible behavior abroad, which is 
significantly more influenced by their DM host irresponsibility norms than their home norms. 
A potential reason for this is the presence of stricter or better defined environmental and social 
regulations for firms operating in developed markets. 
V.2 Sources of Difference in CSI Scores at Home and Abroad 
Next, I test the hypotheses that all subcomponents contribute to the difference in CSI 
norms at home and abroad for DM- and EM-headquartered firms (hypotheses 3a and 3b, 
respectively). For this analysis, I calculate five new variables for DM- and EM-headquartered 
groups. The dependent variable for both market headquarters is the difference between the CSI 
scores at home and abroad and is calculated as Score Abroad – Score at Home. This way, 
positive scores indicate higher CSI when operating abroad versus at home.  The four 
independent variables are the difference between the subcomponent scores (E, S, G, and CC) at 





‘Headquarters_DIFF_Subcomponent’ (i.e., EM_DIFF_S is the mean social score for EM-
headquartered firms when operating abroad minus the mean social score when operating at 
home). The summary statistics for these ‘difference’ variables, shown in Table 13, suggest that 
CSI trends uncovered in the prior section hold for the subcomponents. Specifically, DM-
headquartered firms behave worse across CSI and subcomponent E, S, G, and CC score types 
when operating abroad in EM than they do at home in DM, and EM-headquartered firms behave 
better when operating abroad in DM than they do at home in EM. The higher DM CSI scores 
when operating abroad suggests DM MNEs are on average taking a local versus global approach 
for their ESG/CSR strategies (Wright et al., 2005). 
[Insert Table 13] 
To determine the degree of influence from the subcomponents, I use OLS linear 
regression analysis to regress the dependent variable (the difference in mean CSI scores when 
operating at home and abroad) on the four independent variables (the difference in scores at 
home and abroad for all four subcomponents E, S, G, and CC). This analysis is performed for 
DM-headquartered firms operating in EM (3a) and EM-headquartered firms operating in DM 

























































The results of the regression analysis and t-statistics of the coefficients are reported in 





headquartered firms operating abroad (Panel A and B, respectively), the difference in all 
subcomponent scores contribute positively and significantly to the difference in CSI scores 
when operating abroad versus at home and are jointly non-zero. For DM-headquartered firms, 
the greatest contributor to the variance in the difference in CSI scores at home and abroad comes 
from the difference in Cross-Cutting and Social scores. For EM-headquartered firms, the 
greatest contributor to the variance in CSI scores at home and abroad comes from the difference 
in Cross-Cutting scores, followed by Governance scores. For both market locations, DM and 
EM, the lowest contribution comes from the difference in Environmental scores.  
[Insert Table 14] 
[Insert Table 15] 
While the significance of the independent variables supports hypotheses 3a and 3b, the 
relative size of the coefficients is somewhat surprising. For DM-headquartered firms, the 
influence from the difference in Social scores is supported by anecdotal evidence and academic 
theory that DM-headquartered firms often expand into emerging markets specifically to exploit 
differences in labor markets, working conditions, etc. The strong influence from a difference in 
Cross-Cutting irresponsibility may be explained by an examination of the types of violations 
within the Cross-Cutting subcomponent. A simple incident count shows that two of the five CC 
violation types increase strongly when DM MNEs operate abroad: there is a 252% increase in 
‘violations of international standards’ and a 154% increase in ‘supply chain issues’ over the 
sample period. Both of these types of violations could be considered to fit the anecdotal 
expectations that DM-headquartered firms are expanding into emerging markets to gain a 
specific competitive or cost advantage. While the difference in Environmental scores 





headquartered firms, the lack of contribution may be due to the consistency in greater CSI for 
DM MNEs when operating abroad. In this case, four of the seven Environmental violations 
show incident count increases of 80% or more when operating abroad. 
A look at the incident counts by violation type within each subcomponent may also 
provide potential contextual color for the regression results for EM-headquartered firms. The 
general pattern across the 28 violation types suggests that EM-headquartered incident counts 
fall by roughly 75%-85% when operating abroad in DM. The most notable differences occur in 
the Cross-Cutting and Governance subcomponents, which have the largest coefficients in the 
regression analysis (equation 3b, above). Within the Cross-Cutting subcomponent, the incident 
counts of one violation (‘products - health and environmental issues’) fall by just 62%. This 
may be an indication that DM product standards may be higher and therefore harder to meet for 
some EM producers. In the Governance subcomponent, incident counts for three violations (tax 
evasion, tax optimization, and misleading communications) fall by less than the other violation 
types (approximate declines of 65% versus 75-80%). The lack of consistently lower scores in 
these subcomponents may be part of the higher contribution to the variance from Governance 
scores at home and abroad for EM-headquartered firms. Taken together, the higher coefficients 
for home influence and greater contribution to variation in the home-abroad difference coming 
from Governance and Cross-Cutting violations, is well-supported anecdotally, in practice and 
in the COO literature: EM firms are widely considered to have weaker governance than DM 
firms. 
V.3 Changes in CSI Over Time 
This section seeks to identify improvement in CSIs over time by market of incident 





sample period (January 1, 2007 to July 31, 2020) was divided into four equal parts, t1 through 
t4.  
First, I test to see if CSI norms in DM and EM have improved over time. In order for 
Hypothesis 4 to be true: 
Difference between CSI_DMtx and CSI_DMtx-1 is <0 and statistically significant 
and 
Difference between CSI_EMtx and CSI_EMtx-1 is <0 and statistically significant  (4) 
Contrary to expectations for a reduction in CSI norms, the summary statistics for the 
mean CSI scores at time t1, t2, t3, and t4 for each market incident location (shown in the top 
half of Table 16) suggest CSI norms continue to rise throughout the sample period for both DM 
and EM. Statistical analysis (noted below and shown in the bottom half of Table 13) leads me 
to reject Hypotheses 4 that CSI norms have improved. Specifically, difference in mean scores 
for each time period are statistically significantly positive (>0) in all periods for both DM and 
EM, except for t4 which shows the difference in EM CSI mean versus t3 is positive, but not 
significantly. This result suggests that, despite the additional private and public scrutiny, there 
has been no material improvement in CSI norms over time. However, these results should be 
viewed with caution. It is also possible that the increased focus on ESG issues has contributed 
to an increase in scores over time as (1) CSI is reported more often in the press, (2) CSI incidents 
are being viewed more harshly and thus receive higher scores, or (3) the lack of consistent 
standards prevents firms from understanding exactly how they should improve their CSP and 





[Insert Table 16] 
Next, I examine the individual subcomponents of CSI for signs of improvement over 
time. As a reminder, given the increasing global emphasis on Environmental and Social issues 
over the past few years, Hypothesis 5 expects Environmental and Social scores to show 
improvement in both market locations. Further, Hypothesis 5 expects little change in 






























 is not significant (5c) 
Summary scores for t1-t4 and Tukey’s HSD tests for significant difference in mean score 
pairs shown in Table 17, demonstrate that as is the case at the CSI score level, expectations for 
improvement are not borne out in the subcomponent scores for either DM or EM incident 
locations. Overwhelmingly and with little exception, subcomponent scores continue to rise 
significantly throughout the sample period for both DM and EM incident locations (see Figure 






Figure 8: Subcomponent Scores Over Time 
[Insert Table 17] 
• Hypothesis 5a is rejected as Environmental scores do not show improvement in either 
market location. That said, Environmental scores in EM may be showing signs of 
stabilizing as the mean score in t4 is not significantly different than t3.  
• Hypothesis 5b is partially accepted as Social scores are statistically significantly lower 
in t4 versus t3 in EM. Social scores in DM continue to rise significantly in t4 but are 
increasing at a decreasing rate throughout the sample sub-periods. 
• Hypothesis 5c is rejected as, contrary to expectations for stability, Governance scores 
for both market locations show the largest increase over the sample period and are 
significantly higher in t4 versus t3 for both markets. 
Lastly, I examine patterns of CSI over time based on the 2x2 matrix of market 
headquarters and market incident location. While hypotheses 4 and 5 examine CSI over time in 
DM and EM incident locations, this pattern analysis shifts the focus to CSI by market 
headquarters and does not hypothesize about the results. As shown in the summary scores for 
t1-t4 and Tukey’s HSD tests for significant difference in mean score pairs in Table 18, DM-
headquartered CSI scores may be showing signs of leveling off (do not significantly increase in 
t4) when operating both at home in DM and abroad in EM. Conversely, EM-headquartered CSI 
scores continue to rise significantly for all sub-periods. One explanation for this may be that 
EM-headquartered scores are merely catching up with DM-headquartered CSI norms. For 





36.6, while the DM host mean scores are 40.0. As the DM host mean scores rise throughout the 
sample period, EM-headquartered scores when operating abroad in DM appear to catch up. This 
pattern (shown in Figure 9 below) may be explained by EM-headquartered firms realizing that 
they did not need to bear the cost and burden of maintaining a higher ESG standard than the 
ESG standards of domestic firms operating in DM. And when operating at home, EM-
headquartered firms may also be reducing their ESG quality as they witness DM-headquartered 
firms operating in EM “getting away with” a lower standard of ESG-related behavior. 
 
Figure 9: CSI Norms by Market Incident Location and Market Headquarters Over 
Time 
[Insert Table 18] 
Finally, Table 19 shows the summary scores for t1-t4 and Tukey’s HSD tests for 
significant difference in mean score pairs for subcomponent scores (E, S, G, and CC) by the 
2x2 matrix of market location of incident and market headquarters. A brief summary of the 
main patterns is provided below. 





• Environmental scores continue to rise in DM, driven by an increase in both DM-
headquartered home scores and EM-headquartered abroad scores, but are at a relatively 
lower level than most other score subcomponents. Environmental scores may be 
stabilizing in EM as both DM-headquartered (when abroad) and EM-headquartered (at 
home) scores are not significantly higher in t4. 
• Social scores appear to be stabilizing for DM- and EM-headquartered firms when 
operating at home but continue to rise significantly when operating abroad. 
• Governance scores are rising significantly for all market headquarters and market 
incident location pairs. This notable result may suggest that with environmental and 
social issues increasingly under scrutiny, the rapid globalization and creation of mega-
MNEs is pressuring firms into irresponsible governance tactics in the quest for 
competitive advantage and profits.  
• DM-headquartered Cross-Cutting scores may be stabilizing both at home and abroad, 
but EM-headquartered scores are significantly rising. 
c. Robustness Checks 
As mean scores may be biased by the presence of outliers, I recalculate the sample mean 
scores across time using the median firm-level score for each date and market incident location. 
As shown in Figure 9, the mean subcomponent scores (based on the underlying daily median 
scores) for both DM and EM headquartered firms, both at home and abroad, broadly match the 
patterns from the original database of mean scores over time with daily underlying firm-level 
mean scores. The notable differences are (1) for both DM and EM headquartered firms, the 
Governance and Cross-Cutting medians are lower than the means when operating at home, and 
(2) DM-headquartered median scores are higher than the means across all subcomponents when 
operating abroad. Nonetheless, the similarity in score patterns and magnitudes reduces the 
probability that the main findings are unduly influenced by outliers or that using the medians of 






Figure 10: Mean vs. Median Subcomponent Scores 
Another potential issue with this data is one of frequency versus magnitude. As example, 
a country with just 5 incidents each scoring 60 would be perceived has having a worse CSI 
norm (by either mean or median) than a country with 500 incidents each scoring 50. This 
influence may also change over time if, for example, the media began to report more frequently 
on less-severe but increasingly newsworthy CSI. To address this potential issue, I examined the 
distribution of scores by market headquarters, at home and abroad, and across all time periods. 
As shown in the histograms in tables 20 and 21 in the Appendix, indicators of skewness are 
below +/- 1 for both DM and EM, at home and abroad, and across all time periods suggesting 
distribution of scores are not substantially skewed. Despite the statistical results, a visual 
inspection indicates that EM-headquartered firms have an outsized frequency of scores in the 
20-25 range in t1 and t2. This distribution fades in t3 and t4 but remains evident in the full sample. 
The larger threat to normality is the presence of kurtosis for DM-headquartered firms. Values 
of kurtosis exceed 1 beginning in t2 at home and persisting in t3 and t4 for scores at home and 
abroad. Because kurtosis values are below 2 in all but one instance (DM at home, t4), 





Lastly, there may be an outsized country influence in either market location. Both by 
headquarters and location of incident, the US is the largest DM incident-count contributor to 
global CSI and China is the largest EM contributor (refer to Tables 2 and 3 for counts). Because 
of this, MNEs from these two locations may be largely or disproportionately responsible for the 
results found in this body of research. To determine if the results would be similar without these 
influences, I created a new dataset that excludes firms headquartered in the US and China. The 
patterns, shown in Figure 10 below, for the market-based norms (based on the original firm-
level means) across the subcomponents are consistent with the full sample: norms for DM-
headquartered firms are higher when operating abroad versus at home, while norms for EM-
headquartered firms are lower when operating abroad versus at home. Also consistent with the 
full sample, EM and DM CSI home norms are not statistically significantly different. That said, 
there are some notable differences. First, DM norm scores at home are higher when excluding 
US-headquartered firms but are lower when operating abroad. This suggests US firms may be 
disproportionately responsible for the difference in scores at home and abroad (they behave 
much better at home and much worse abroad). Second, EM norm scores are higher across all 
subcomponents, both at home and abroad, when excluding China-headquartered firms. This 
suggests China-headquartered firms may be less ‘bad actors’ than popularly characterized. 
More generally, the incident count data demonstrates that the US has a disproportionate role in 
CSI incidents from both a headquarters and location perspective, representing 33% and 15% of 
global CSI incidents, respectively (Table 22). Beyond the US, single country influence appears 
reasonable as no one country accounts for more than 7% of global incidents by headquarters or 
location of CSI. 














This research supports practitioner expectations that ESG quality is poorer in emerging 
markets versus developed markets. It also provides evidence to support the conjectures that 
developed market firms expand into emerging markets to take advantage of weaker regulations 
and reduced penalties for irresponsible ESG-related behavior, while emerging market firms 
maintain better ESG behavior when operating abroad in developed markets to maintain their 
reputation and ‘license to do business.’  Importantly, this research shows that MNEs from both 
market headquarters often ‘over-adopt’ the perceived norms of their host market. Because of 
these extremes, the perception of poorer ESG quality in EM may be largely due to DM MNEs 
rather than domestic firms, and vice versa. This suggests that the popular notion from 
practitioners and ESG rating agencies that market-based ESG quality patterns mirror credit 
quality patterns (i.e., that EM is poorer and DM is better) may be inadvertently biased. In other 
words, in practice, an EM-based multinational may be perceived or rated as having a poorer 
ESG quality based unfairly on its market headquarters rather than its actual ESG behavior or 
impact. And DM-based multinationals may garner higher third-party ESG ratings when positive 
and negative ESG activities are netted and consequently obscure the downside risk signals from 
DM MNE’s poorer CSI behavior abroad. 
Regarding the subcomponents of CSI, environmental and social irresponsibility tends 
to be lower than governance and cross-cutting irresponsibility. Similarly, irresponsible 
environmental and social behaviors may be leveling off, while governance and cross-cutting 
behavior continues to worsen. This suggests that the increased attention from both the public 





less irresponsible behavior in these areas by firms around the world. It also suggests that less 
focus by the public, policymakers, and academics may inadvertently be contributing to firms’ 
willingness to act irresponsibly on issues of governance. This result is particularly important in 
light of the findings by Dimson et al. (2015), which finds that financial market reaction is 
positive after successful engagements on issues of corporate governance and Dyck et al. (2010), 
which finds that the media can act as an effective whistle-blower for corporate fraud. Lastly, it 
highlights that governance remains a major area of weakness and should not be left out of 
academic research which often focuses solely on environmental and social issues. Lastly, this 
finding may be particularly useful for practitioners (i.e., investors) looking to effect change, 
especially in light of recent research on the effectiveness of coordinated engagements and CSP 
outcomes (Dimson et al. 2020). 
Finally, globalization may be leveling the playing field for EM-headquartered MNEs. 
After years of outperforming on ESG metrics to overcome the negative perceptions based on 
their country-of-origin and watching their DM-headquartered peers behave more irresponsibly 
but with seemingly less reputational, if not financial and regulatory consequence, EM-
headquartered firm irresponsibility norms are aligning with their DM peers and for the worse, 
not better. In addition to these EM/DM headquartered trends, this research points out that there 
is no concrete evidence that ESG quality is materially improving over time. Combined, these 
findings suggest that a globally coordinated approach by both policymakers and practitioners, 
as well as thoughtful examination by academics across all aspects of ESG factors, is the best 





VI.2 Limitations & Future Research 
There are three main sources of limitation with regard to this research based on what is 
being measured, the data source, and the market delineations. First, because only irresponsible 
behavior is being scored, there is a potential issue of truncation in what is being measured. As 
a result, this data does not measure overall ESG quality, but rather only the negative aspect of 
ESG behavior. Adding the positive ESG behavior of firms when operating at home and abroad 
into scores would undoubtedly yield different results. As such, the results of this paper need to 
be carefully considered and viewed only from the lens of irresponsible ESG behavior norms 
rather than overall ESG quality.  
Second, the data is primarily based on media reports which may introduce unintended 
bias. Generally, media bias may cause scores to be higher or lower based on either the location 
of the CSI incident or location of headquarters. For example, scores may be artificially lower 
in EM if ESG-related stories are not as newsworthy and thus less reported (bias of omission), 
or artificially higher if there is a lower standard for reporting (allowing for more unsubstantiated 
claims of bad behavior to be reported). In DM, media and NGO reports that rely on 
sensationalism or ‘mudslinging’ to increase readership or obtain global attention may target or 
report more often on certain industries or MNEs (i.e., well-known DM-headquartered global 
brands or large energy firms).   
Third, there are also likely significant EM/DM and regional differences in ESG 
sensitivities and therefore the threshold for newsworthiness of CSI incidents. These differences 
undoubtedly influence media reporting patterns based on the ESG-related topics covered, the 
reporter’s perception of severity, frequency, etc. More broadly, to the extent that much of the 





acceptable ESG behavior (Gugler & Shi, 2009). Finally, while using EM/DM market 
delineations aligns well with investment practitioners, there are likely many ESG-related 
differences between the regions and countries that comprise each market group and this lack of 
homogeneity may skew the data.  
Another limitation is the time span of the sample. While spanning a longer time period 
than much of the extant literature should help illuminate patterns of change, the rapid evolution 
in ESG constructs and regulations as well as the practice of sustainable finance introduces 
uncertainty regarding the consistency of the findings over time. In this way, the lack of 
significant improvement in CSI may be due to factors other than malice. For example, because 
regulations are still not comprehensive or uniform, firms may not know exactly what is expected 
of them to demonstrate responsible ESG behavior. Or, because of the increase in public interest, 
media reporting may be getting harsher. This may be evidenced by the fact that incident counts 
have gone down in the most recent period, but mean CSI scores have generally not improved. 
Relatedly, the media biases noted above are also likely changing with time. As such, the results 
in section V.3 Changes in CSI Over Time should be viewed cautiously. 
Future research could be designed to address some of the data and market issues noted 
above but could also delve further into claims versus behaviors or specific ESG variables. For 
example, to help answer questions relating to greenwashing, it would be interesting to examine 
firm claims (CSR reports or third-party ratings) versus public reports of behavior (using 
RepRisk data or other measures of behavior) to identify instances where firms may say one 
thing and do another. Relating to the subcomponents, it would be interesting to look more 
closely at the 28 violations of ESG-related principals RepRisk identifies and how these differ 





governance behaviors warrant more research. It would be particularly interesting to examine 
MNE governance irresponsibility with the large body of research on CSP and litigation which 
suggests that firms would want to export higher CSP to reduce that risk when operating abroad 







With 12,765 firms in 160 countries having committed to responsible and sustainable 
practices under the UN Global Compact12, it is critical that practitioners, policymakers, and 
academics investigate the degree to which these proclamations are bearing fruit.  In asking the 
question “Do multinational enterprises export or adopt Corporate Social Irresponsibility?” I 
explore patterns of CSI norms in developed and emerging markets based on both market 
headquarters and location of CSI. I show that while emerging market CSI scores are generally 
poorer than developed markets, this may be more attributable to the perpetrator of the CSI than 
the locally accepted CSI norm. Because the evidence shows that environmental and social 
irresponsible behavior may be leveling off while governance-related irresponsibility is still 
rising, I also suggest that public and media attention (inattention) may be having a positive 
(negative) impact on ESG-related behaviors. Finally, I explore changes in CSI over time and 
find that little improvement is evident to date. From this, I conclude that more time, attention, 
and focus from global regulators and investors is still required to ensure a more sustainable 








Appendix A: Tables 
 
Table 1: List of violations by CSI subcomponent 





Climate change, GHG emissions, and global pollution Freedom of association and collective bargaining
Impacts on landscapes, ecosystems, and biodiversity Human rights abuses and corporate complicity
Overuse and wasting of resources Occupational health and safety issues
Impacts on communities Discrimination in employment
Animal mistreatment Poor employment conditions
Local pollution Local participation issues




Corruption, bribery, extortion, and money laundering Products (health and environmental issues)
Executive compensation issues Violation of international standards
Misleading communication Controversial products and services
Anti-competitive practices Violation of national legislation







Table 2: List of Developed Market Countries 
This table identifies Developed Market countries according to the International Monetary Fund’s 
World Economic Outlook. It also shows the number of CSI incidents based on where the incident 
occurred and the number of CSI incidents based on the headquarters of the firm responsible for 
the incident. The incident count data is from RepRisk and covers the sample period January 2, 


































New Zealand 2,298 376
Norway 2,612 1,509
Portugal 1,626 595
Puerto Rico 256 6








United Kingdom 17,978 18,869
United States of America 90,716 90,106





Table 3: List of Emerging Market Countries 
This table identifies Emerging Market countries according to the International Monetary Fund’s 
World Economic Outlook. It also shows the number of CSI incidents based on where the incident 
occurred and the number of CSI incidents based on the headquarters of the firm responsible for 
the incident. The incident count data is from RepRisk and covers the sample period January 2, 





















Afghanistan 400 0 Gambia 261 0 Palau 17 0
Albania 284 0 Georgia 1,775 10 Panama 3,999 53
Algeria 1,368 0 Ghana 2,225 22 Papua New Guinea 2,415 75
Angola 1,750 0 Grenada 27 0 Paraguay 937 15
Antigua and Barbuda 1,295 0 Guatemala 2,335 21 Peru 5,853 482
Argentina 5,519 480 Guinea 968 4 Philippines 6,377 1,213
Armenia 197 0 Guinea-Bissau 6 0 Poland 3,386 304
Aruba 1,190 0 Guyana 275 0 Romania 2,501 43
Azerbaijan 948 95 Haiti 168 0 Russian Federation 10,879 5,130
Bahamas 1,253 2 Honduras 1,383 42 Rwanda 211 2
Bahrain 2,150 50 Hungary 1,971 93 Saint Kitts and Nevis 1,195 0
Bangladesh 5,285 149 India 15,875 6,115 Saint Lucia 1,192 0
Barbados 1,365 15 Indonesia 13,513 1,648 St. Vincent and Grenadines 467 0
Belarus 184 0 Iran 2,180 108 Samoa 822 0
Belize 698 13 Iraq 1,852 6 Sao Tome and Principe 79 0
Benin 509 0 Jamaica 691 7 Saudi Arabia 2,175 202
Bhutan 191 0 Jordan 1,994 104 Senegal 1,556 2
Bolivia 1,402 4 Kazakhstan 2,901 279 Serbia 1,383 22
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1,399 30 Kenya 2,992 214 Seychelles 1,009 0
Botswana 1,380 26 Kiribati 4 0 Sierra Leone 1,341 0
Brazil 19,579 9,707 Kuwait 758 79 Solomon Islands 54 0
Brunei Darussalam 65 0 Kyrgyzstan 212 11 Somalia 261 0
Bulgaria 1,892 43 Lao 2,556 0 South Africa 8,181 2,355
Burkina Faso 483 1 Lebanon 1,496 44 South Sudan 424 0
Burundi 91 1 Lesotho 433 0 Sri Lanka 1,723 67
Cabo Verde 65 3 Liberia 3,160 1 Sudan 2,200 7
Cambodia 3,482 2 Libya 1,272 1 Suriname 117 0
Cameroon 1,791 68 Madagascar 1,308 0 Syrian Arab Republic 845 5
Central African Republic 191 0 Malawi 1,207 7 Tajikistan 606 0
Chad 507 0 Malaysia 6,301 1,877 Tanzania 2,989 19
Chile 4,354 1,124 Maldives 461 0 Thailand 3,881 850
China 28,327 13,862 Mali 903 0 Timor-Leste 202 0
Colombia 6,839 474 Marshall Islands 806 14 Togo 423 40
Comoros 49 0 Mauritania 386 0 Tonga 7 0
Congo 4,530 0 Mauritius 2,508 84 Trinidad and Tobago 110 45
Congo (Democratic Republic) 637 0 Mexico 7,256 1,705 Tunisia 629 27
Costa Rica 1,882 22 Micronesia 13 0 Turkey 4,142 283
Côte d'Ivoire 2,354 128 Moldova 754 95 Turkmenistan 343 0
Croatia 613 60 Mongolia 2,034 9 Tuvalu 2 0
Djibouti 216 0 Montenegro 248 11 Uganda 1,918 17
Dominica 34 0 Morocco 2,719 112 Ukraine 2,844 364
Dominican Republic 2,116 2 Mozambique 3,424 13 United Arab Emirates 2,913 302
Ecuador 3,042 155 Myanmar 3,871 7 Uruguay 944 1
Egypt 2,955 228 Namibia 695 4 Uzbekistan 1,392 2
El Salvador 1,344 3 Nauru 170 0 Vanuatu 56 0
Equatorial Guinea 415 0 Nepal 717 5 Venezuela 2,054 484
Eritrea 237 0 Nicaragua 530 0 Viet Nam 3,713 146
Eswatini 987 6 Niger 779 0 Yemen 924 0
Ethiopia 1,532 0 Nigeria 7,076 660 Zambia 2,689 211
Fiji 122 0 Oman 500 17 Zimbabwe 1,958 71
Gabon 1,145 8 Pakistan 3,699 375 96,338 12,839





Table 4: Variables Defined 










































Scores in this group are mean scores for DM-headquartered firms (prefix) with incidents 
occuring at home in a developed market country (middle code DM). The suffix indicates 
the score type.
Scores in this group are mean scores for EM-headquartered firms (prefix) with incidents 
occuring at home in an emerging market (middle codeEM). The suffix indicates the score 
type.
Mean Score by Score Type and Market of Incident Location:
Mean Score by Market Headquarters When Operating at Home, and Score Type:
Prefix lists score type (CSI-combined score, E-Environmental, S-Social, G-Governance, 
CC-Cross-Cutting); DM suffix indicates the market where the behavior incident occurred, 
a developed market country for these scores.
Prefix lists score type (CSI-combined score, E-Environmental, S-Social, G-Governance, 
CC-Cross-Cutting); EM suffix indicates the market where the behavior incident occurred, 
an emerging market country for these scores.
Scores in this group represent a difference in mean scores (middle code DIFF) and are 
calculated as score abroad minus mean score at home. Prefix EM indicates scores are for 
EM-headquartered firms, suffix indicates the score type.
Mean Score by Market Headquarters When Operating at Abroad, and Score Type:
Scores in this group are mean scores for DM-headquartered firms (prefix) with incidents 
occuring abroad in an emerging market country (middle code EM). The suffix indicates 
the score type.
Scores in this group are mean scores for EM-headquartered firms (prefix) with incidents 
occuring abroad in a developed market country (middle code DM). The suffix indicates 
the score type.
Difference in Mean Score at Home and Abroad, by Market Headquarters and Score Type:
Scores in this group represent a difference in mean scores (middle code DIFF) and are 
calculated as score abroad minus mean score at home. Prefix DM indicates scores are for 





Table 5: Summary Statistics by Incident Location 
This table reports the mean CSI score and mean subcomponent scores for incidents occurring in 





CSI E S G CC CSI E S G CC
#Obs 4808 4751 4752 4590 4746 4830 4769 4803 4640 4769
Minimum 20.23 13.59 16.09 11.58 17.08 17.75 15.22 15.05 17.50 13.34
Maximum 86.22 79.37 74.02 86.38 86.22 92.49 90.17 91.95 92.42 91.34
Mean 46.34 40.42 41.89 43.08 43.86 52.20 49.75 51.30 47.91 49.40
Std. Deviation 7.88 6.68 6.37 8.31 7.50 9.65 9.48 9.46 10.03 9.58





Table 6: Comparing Mean Scores by Market of Incident Location 
This table reports the paired-samples t-test results for CSI and subcomponent mean scores between 
developed and emerging market located incidents for the sample period January 2, 2007 to July 








CSI E S G CC
Paired Difference -6.03*** -9.58*** -9.66*** -4.99*** -5.70***
Std. Deviation 9.82 9.84 9.57 9.76 9.40
T-test -42.18 -66.15 -68.83 -34.17 -41.26
df 4720 4620 4652 4459 4630





Table 7: Summary Statistics for CSI Scores at Home and Abroad by Market Headquarters 
This table reports the mean CSI score by market headquarters, at home and abroad, for the sample 





Home Abroad Home Abroad
#Obs 4,803 4,699 4,541 2,563
Minimum 20.23 17.75 19.82 20.23
Maximum 85.94 95.40 92.31 86.82
Mean 46.53 55.70 46.64 43.18
Std. Deviation 7.94 10.80 11.27 13.51





Table 8: Comparing Mean Scores by Market Headquarters, at Home and Abroad 
This table reports the paired-samples t-tests for mean CSI scores. Panel A shows t-tests for 
incidents occurring abroad versus home and abroad versus host for DM-headquartered firms, and 
Panel B for EM-headquartered firms. Panel C compares the mean CSI scores when operating at 
home for DM- and EM-headquartered firms. All statistics are for the sample period January 2, 












DM Abroad vs. DM Abroad vs. EM Abroad vs. EM Abroad vs. DM Home vs.
DM Home EM Host EM Home DM Host EM Home
Paired Difference 9.31*** 9.23*** -5.47*** -5.39*** 0.19
Std. Deviation 10.65 13.01 12.78 13.12 11.98
T-test 59.26 47.10 -21.45 -20.80 1.08
df 4,599 4,409 2,516 2,557 4,458






Table 9: Summary Statistics for CSI and Subcomponent Scores by Market Headquarters and Market of Incident Location 
Panel A of this table reports the mean CSI score and mean subcomponent scores for DM-headquartered firms when operating at home 
and abroad. Panel B reports the mean CSI score and mean subcomponent scores for EM-headquartered firms when operating at home 




E S G CC E S G CC E S G CC ESG E S G CC
#Obs 4746 4745 4588 4743 4603 4659 4493 4635 4365 4448 4141 4383 2563 1926 2102 2237 2387
Minimum 13.59 16.09 11.58 17.08 15.22 15.05 11.45 14.27 10.68 11.50 10.14 10.68 20.23 10.30 8.06 10.14 10.83
Maximum 79.37 74.02 86.03 85.99 91.84 95.00 95.23 92.58 88.92 92.17 92.29 90.44 86.82 78.12 78.23 87.13 86.69
Mean 40.44 42.03 43.17 44.01 52.26 54.65 50.83 52.91 45.43 45.42 42.90 43.59 43.18 41.00 40.12 42.13 41.27
Std. Deviation 6.75 6.44 8.34 7.55 11.09 10.65 11.05 10.69 10.61 10.74 12.06 11.11 13.51 10.28 10.27 13.96 12.99
Panel A: Developed Market Headquartered Firms Panel B: Emerging Market Headquartered Firms





Table 10: Comparing Mean Scores at Home by Market Headquarters  
This table reports the paired-samples t-tests for subcomponent mean scores between DM-
headquartered and EM-headquartered firms when operating at home for the sample period January 




Environmental  Social Governance Cross-Cutting
Paired Difference -4.93*** -3.26*** 0.89*** 0.89***
Std. Deviation 11.66 11.48 12.28 11.61
t -test -27.61 -18.73 4.59 5.05
df 4,261 4,339 4,045 4,299





Table 11: CSI Scores Abroad as a Function of CSI Norm Scores at Home and at Host  
This table reports the OLS coefficient estimates, test of difference, and t-statistics of equations 2a 
and 2b using daily data for the sample period January 2, 2007 to July 31, 2020. Panel A regresses 
the independent variable DM_DM_CSI, representing the DM CSI home norm, and EM_EM_CSI, 
representing the EM host norm on DM_EM_CSI, representing the DM norm when operating 
abroad. Panel B regresses the independent variables EM_EM_CSI (EM home norm) and 
DM_DM_CSI (DM host norm) on EM_DM_CSI, the EM norm when operating abroad. Figures 
market with ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, and t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. 
   
 
 
Panel A Panel B

















Table 12: Subcomponent Scores Abroad as a Function of Subcomponent Norms at Home and at Host 
This table reports the OLS coefficient estimates, test of difference, and t-statistics using mean subcomponent score when operating 
abroad as the dependent variable using daily data for the sample period January 2, 2007 to July 31, 2020. For each subcomponent panel, 
Panel A regresses the independent variables DM home norm and EM host norm on the DM abroad norm, and Panel B regresses the 
independent variables EM home norm and DM host norm on the EM abroad norm. Figures market with ***, **, * are significant at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, and t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Panel A Panel B Panel A Panel B Panel A Panel B Panel A Panel B
Dependent Variable DM_EM_E EM_DM_E DM_EM_S EM_DM_S DM_EM_G EM_DM_G DM_EM_CC EM_DM_CC
Constant 32.192 12.181 30.748 9.580 24.878 -0.512 28.216 1.329
DM_DM_ 0.315*** 0.406*** 0.399*** 0.403*** 0.442*** 0.357*** 0.422*** 0.361***
(12.95) (10.02) (16.71) (9.79) (21.77) (9.01) (20.64) (9.16)
EM_EM_ 0.168*** 0.253*** 0.164*** 0.279*** 0.169*** 0.569*** 0.15*** 0.509***
(11.27) (10.24) (12.03) (11.80) (13.03) (23.77) (11.48) (21.68)
Difference 0.147*** 0.153*** 0.235*** 0.124** 0.273*** -0.212*** 0.272*** -0.148***
(4.87) (3.02) (8.03) (2.44) (10.07) (-4.07) (10.12) (-2.93)
Joint Test, F 169.63 122.02 247.70 139.66 445.91 422.56 358.52 344.81
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R
2 0.076 0.115 0.105 0.120 0.185 0.279 0.146 0.228






Table 13: Summary Statistics for the Difference in Scores at Home and Abroad by Market 
Headquarters and Score Type 
This table reports the mean of the differences in scores (calculated as mean home score minus 
mean abroad score). The first panel shows the home-abroad difference in mean CSI and mean 
subcomponent scores for DM-headquartered firms and the second panel shows the home-abroad 
difference in mean CSI and mean subcomponent scores for EM-headquartered firms. Statistics are 





CSI E S G CC CSI E S G CC
#Obs 4,600 4,473 4,522 4,332 4,509 2,517 1,878 2,057 2,191 2,339
Minimum -34.23 -34.19 -29.98 -37.96 -34.99 -53.94 -50.27 -51.94 -48.09 -47.55
Maximum 63.69 61.58 64.44 56.81 63.45 53.30 39.69 37.37 42.10 56.80
Mean 9.31 12.01 12.85 7.77 9.04 -5.47 -6.66 -7.24 -3.99 -4.61
Std. Deviation 10.65 11.22 10.50 10.57 10.28 12.78 11.79 11.59 12.77 12.50





Table 14: Difference in CSI Scores Abroad and at Home as a Function of Difference in 
Subcomponent Scores, by Market Headquarters 
This table reports the OLS coefficient estimates and t-statistics for equations 3a and 3b using daily 
data for the sample period January 2, 2007 to July 31, 2020. Panel A regresses the independent 
variables (abroad-home difference in subcomponent scores) on the dependent variable 
DM_DIFF_CSI, representing the abroad-home difference in DM-headquartered firm CSI scores. 
Panel B regresses the independent variables (abroad-home difference in subcomponent scores) on 
EM_DIFF_CSI, representing the abroad-home difference in EM-headquartered firm CSI scores. 





Panel A Panel B




























Table 15: Difference in Coefficients of Subcomponent Scores 
This table reports the difference in subcomponent coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions 
presented in Table 14, with the t-statistics shown in parentheses. Panel A shows results for the 
difference in DM-headquartered subcomponent DIFF scores. Panel B shows results for the 
difference in EM-headquartered subcomponent DIFF scores. Figures market with ***, **, * are 















EM_DIFF_CC -0.395*** -0.323*** -0.235***
(15.74) (11.08) (7.80)
Panel A: Difference in DM Subcomponent DIFF Scores





Table 16: Summary Statistics and Tukey’s HSD for Mean CSI Scores Over Time by Market 
of Incident 
The top half of the table reports the mean CSI scores by market of incident location for each 
subsample time period t1-t4, which represent equal portions of the sample period January 2, 2007 
to July 31, 2020. The bottom half of the table reports the Tukey’s HSD results for difference in 
paired mean scores for each subsample time period t1-t4. Figures market with ***, **, * are 




t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4
#Obs 1,098 1,235 1,236 1,239 1,148 1,212 1,232 1,238
Minimum 20.23 23.95 27.49 28.61 20.23 20.23 17.75 26.28
Maximum 77.70 70.16 73.82 86.22 90.34 87.76 92.49 91.07
Mean 39.83 44.49 49.74 50.56 48.37 50.61 54.56 54.95
Std. Deviation 8.46 6.41 5.76 5.79 12.26 9.01 7.55 7.64
t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4
t1 4.659*** 9.912*** 10.735*** 2.241*** 6.189*** 6.579***
t2 5.253*** 6.076*** 3.948*** 4.338***
t3 0.823** 0.389
t4
DM CSI Score EM CSI Score





Table 17: Summary Statistics and Tukey’s HSD for Mean Subcomponent Scores Over Time by Market of Incident 
The top half of the table shows mean scores for incidents in DM, while the bottom half shows mean scores for incidents in EM. For 
each half of the table, summary statistics are shown first by subsample time periods t1-t4 and subcomponent score: E (environmental), S 
(social), G (governance), and CC (cross-cutting), followed by the Tukey’s HSD results for difference in paired mean scores for 
subsample time periods t1-t4, which represent equal portions of the sample period January 2, 2007 to July 31, 2020. Figures market with 
***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4
#Obs 1,046 1,231 1,236 1,238 1,045 1,232 1,236 1,239 887 1,228 1,236 1,239 1,038 1,233 1,236 1,239
Minimum 18.63 13.59 19.20 25.14 16.17 16.09 20.64 26.09 11.58 16.92 24.09 23.92 17.08 20.14 26.17 26.19
Maximum 72.41 79.37 61.01 67.98 74.02 69.01 64.48 64.78 68.51 74.11 76.27 86.38 68.34 67.64 75.31 86.22
Mean 38.10 40.21 40.80 42.21 38.71 41.48 43.09 43.79 35.72 40.49 46.28 47.72 37.44 42.14 47.12 47.71
Std. Deviation 8.26 7.20 5.01 5.38 8.21 6.38 5.06 4.38 8.57 6.77 6.45 6.24 7.90 6.02 5.77 5.58
t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4
t1 2.11*** 2.696*** 4.111*** 2.767*** 4.38*** 5.084*** 4.762*** 10.556*** 11.997*** 4.700*** 9.682*** 10.266***
t2 0.586 2.001*** 1.613*** 2.317*** 5.794*** 7.235*** 4.982*** 5.566***
t3 1.415*** 0.704** 1.441*** 0.584*
t4
t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4
#Obs 1,111 1,197 1,226 1,235 1,130 1,206 1,230 1,237 980 1,193 1,230 1,237 1,094 1,206 1,231 1,238
Minimum 18.77 19.90 18.66 15.22 16.06 15.05 17.75 23.06 17.50 17.58 21.66 23.06 16.06 13.34 23.06 23.06
Maximum 90.17 84.90 83.76 78.78 89.79 87.62 91.95 78.44 80.06 83.68 92.42 91.13 88.80 84.42 91.34 91.14
Mean 47.16 49.07 51.55 50.97 48.58 51.24 53.62 51.52 42.32 44.88 50.21 52.96 44.79 47.78 51.78 52.66
Std. Deviation 12.70 9.29 7.41 7.27 12.72 9.11 7.71 6.89 11.37 9.33 7.99 7.95 11.97 8.85 7.44 7.63
t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4
t1 1.908*** 4.391*** 3.808*** 2.66*** 5.037*** 2.941*** 2.565*** 7.894*** 10.646*** 2.993*** 6.985*** 7.872***
t2 2.483*** 1.900*** 2.377*** 0.281 5.329*** 8.081*** 3.992*** 4.879***
t3 -0.583 -2.096*** 2.572*** 0.887*
t4
Tukey's HSD S Score Tukey's HSD G Score Tukey's HSD CC Score
Tukey's HSD E Score Tukey's HSD S Score Tukey's HSD G Score Tukey's HSD CC Score
Subcomponent Scores for Incidents Located in Emerging Markets
E Score S Score G Score CC Score
Subcomponent Scores for Incidents Located in Developed Markets
E Score S Score G Score CC Score





Table 18: Summary Statistics and Tukey’s HSD for Mean CSI Scores Over Time by Market Headquarters, at Home 
and Abroad 
Panel A shows DM-headquartered mean CSI scores split by location of incident (at home in DM and abroad in EM) for subsample time 
periods t1-t4, while Panel B shows EM-headquartered scores split by location of incident (at home in EM and abroad in DM) for 
subsample time periods t1-t4. The last line of the table shows the results for Tukey’s HSD for the difference in paired mean scores, tx – 
tx-1, where tx represents four equal portions of the sample period January 2, 2007 to July 31, 2020. Figures market with ***, **, * are 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4
#Obs 1,093 1,235 1,236 1,239 1,090 1,178 1,203 1,228 959 1,137 1,212 1,233 250 495 845 973
Minimum 20.23 23.95 22.71 28.61 20.23 20.23 17.75 23.06 20.23 19.82 20.23 21.47 20.23 20.23 20.23 20.23
Maximum 77.70 70.85 73.82 85.94 90.34 88.96 95.40 91.57 89.23 80.22 86.47 92.31 70.31 69.97 80.46 86.82
Mean 40.02 44.74 50.02 50.58 50.75 55.01 58.43 58.07 43.77 42.70 48.46 50.72 36.64 36.06 42.73 48.87
Std. Deviation 8.54 6.51 5.86 5.88 13.73 10.20 8.20 8.86 13.09 10.49 9.77 9.93 10.51 9.99 11.98 14.42
Tukey's HSD, tx-tx-1 4.722*** 5.279*** 0.563 4.263*** 3.418*** -0.358 -1.070 5.762*** 2.264*** -0.582 6.670*** 6.143***
Panel B: EM-Headquartered






Table 19: Summary Statistics, Tukey’s HSD for Mean Subcomponent Scores Over Time by Market Headquarters, at Home and Abroad 
The table is divided into four sections for each of the subcomponent scores Environmental, Social, Governance, and Cross-Cutting. Within each 
section, Panel A shows DM-headquartered scores by location of incident (at home in DM and abroad in EM) for subsamples t1-t4, while Panel 
B shows EM-headquartered scores by location of incident (at home in EM and abroad in DM) for subsamples t1-t4. The last line of the table 
shows the results for Tukey’s HSD for the difference in paired mean scores, tx – tx-1, where tx represents four equal portions of the sample period 
January 2, 2007 to July 31, 2020. Figures market with ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4
#Obs 1,043 1,231 1,235 1,237 1,036 1,156 1,192 1,219 880 1,087 1,182 1,216 187 310 628 801
Minimum 18.63 13.59 19.20 24.62 18.77 17.37 16.17 15.22 13.71 10.68 14.18 15.32 19.24 14.81 12.88 10.30
Maximum 72.41 79.37 61.01 68.25 90.17 91.84 84.00 82.03 84.85 80.50 83.42 88.92 70.31 68.25 78.12 70.27
Mean 38.21 40.30 40.82 42.10 49.20 52.27 53.96 53.17 43.37 43.03 47.10 47.45 35.64 37.42 41.13 43.52
Std. Deviation 8.30 7.29 5.09 5.57 14.28 11.21 8.54 9.45 12.95 10.78 9.34 8.90 9.89 10.58 9.59 9.90
Tukey's HSD, tx-tx-1 2.082*** 0.520 1.289*** 3.072*** 1.688*** -0.791 -0.346 4.069*** 0.354 1.782 3.708*** 2.387***
t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4
#Obs 1,038 1,232 1,236 1,239 1,064 1,168 1,201 1,226 915 1,105 1,202 1,226 194 364 678 866
Minimum 18.89 16.09 20.64 26.09 16.06 15.05 17.75 20.23 16.47 11.50 17.84 14.00 16.17 14.74 8.06 10.73
Maximum 74.02 69.96 64.48 64.34 89.79 88.76 95.00 82.49 89.11 82.52 84.78 92.17 70.31 68.55 78.23 70.37
Mean 38.96 41.59 43.22 43.83 50.98 54.94 57.25 55.00 44.25 43.50 47.10 46.38 35.73 37.14 39.47 42.87
Std. Deviation 8.27 6.49 5.17 4.52 13.75 10.41 8.48 8.68 13.91 10.91 9.40 8.51 10.53 10.68 9.07 10.16
Tukey's HSD, tx-tx-1 2.63*** 1.629*** 0.609* 3.967*** 2.309*** -2.247*** -0.750 3.595*** -0.719 1.409 2.327*** 3.395***
t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4
#Obs 886 1,228 1,235 1,239 918 1,156 1,197 1,222 653 1,057 1,205 1,226 92 417 797 931
Minimum 11.58 16.92 22.95 24.66 11.45 16.56 20.62 17.49 16.47 10.14 20.05 18.99 19.87 10.14 14.28 11.96
Maximum 68.51 74.11 76.27 86.03 80.06 89.11 95.23 91.42 78.12 77.49 84.52 92.29 59.01 67.25 78.92 87.13
Mean 35.77 40.67 46.47 47.63 44.32 48.44 53.59 55.27 36.30 37.64 44.54 49.35 33.62 33.52 40.79 47.97
Std. Deviation 8.64 6.86 6.54 6.27 12.82 10.56 8.62 9.10 12.49 10.62 10.23 10.83 9.66 9.62 12.14 14.69
Tukey's HSD, tx-tx-1 4.895*** 5.801*** 1.161*** 4.126*** 5.145*** 1.679*** 1.336* 6.903*** 4.807*** -0.102 7.265*** 7.18***
t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4
#Obs 1,035 1,233 1,236 1,239 1,036 1,171 1,201 1,227 834 1,112 1,205 1,232 191 446 812 938
Minimum 17.08 21.34 20.23 26.19 16.06 18.11 14.27 17.55 14.84 10.68 21.99 15.13 17.08 14.14 10.83 13.67
Maximum 68.34 68.39 75.31 85.99 88.80 84.78 91.34 92.58 85.18 78.78 82.48 90.44 59.41 67.26 78.27 86.69
Mean 37.58 42.35 47.39 47.66 47.15 52.21 55.65 55.76 39.91 39.04 45.45 48.37 35.46 34.19 40.08 46.86
Std. Deviation 7.98 6.08 5.89 5.64 13.31 9.76 8.16 9.08 12.45 9.87 9.73 9.99 9.80 9.43 11.15 14.04
Tukey's HSD, tx-tx-1 4.766*** 5.044*** 0.269 5.06*** 3.441*** 0.109 -0.873 6.407*** 2.92*** -1.271 5.886*** 6.779***
Cross-Cutting Scores
Panel A: DM-Headquartered Panel B: EM-Headquartered
DM Home DM Abroad EM Home EM Abroad
Panel A: DM-Headquartered Panel B: EM-Headquartered
DM Home DM Abroad EM Home EM Abroad




Panel A: DM-Headquartered Panel B: EM-Headquartered
Panel A: DM-Headquartered Panel B: EM-Headquartered





Table 20: Histogram of DM-headquartered CSI scores, at home and abroad, over time 
Panel A shows the distribution of DM CSI scores at home, Panel B shows the distribution of DM 
CSI scores abroad. The top charts are for the full sample, followed by subsamples for time periods 
t1-t4, which represent equal portions of the sample period January 2, 2007 to July 31, 2020.  
  
Panel A - Scores at Home Panel B - Scores Abroad

























Table 21: Histogram of EM-headquartered CSI scores, at home and abroad, over time 
Panel A shows EM CSI scores at home, Panel B shows EM CSI scores abroad. The top chart is 
for the full sample, followed by subsamples for time periods t1- t4, which represent equal portions 
of the sample period January 2, 2007 to July 31, 2020.  
 
Panel A - Scores at Home Panel B - Scores Abroad

























Table 22: Top Incident Counts by Country 
Panel A is the number CSI incidents by country of headquarters as a percent of total CSI incidents, 
while Panel B is the number of CSI incidents by country where the incident occurred as a percent 
of total CSI incidents. Data is daily for the sample period January 2, 2007 to July 31, 2020.  
 
 
United States of America 33% United States of America 15%
United Kingdom 7% China 5%
Korea 6% Brazil 3%
China 5% United Kingdom 3%
Germany 5% Korea 3%
Japan 4% India 3%
Canada 4% Indonesia 2%
France 4% Canada 2%
Switzerland 4% Russian Federation 2%
Brazil 4% Germany 2%
By Headquarters (Perpetrator) By Incident Location
Top CSI Incident Counts by Country as Percent of Global Incidents
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